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I fought the law and the law won 
 
Abstract 
This article examines the introduction of community policing in Dire Dawa, Ethiopia. It shows that 
the relationship between the security actors within the district is a complex one that neither 
represents a simple dichotomy between state and non-state, nor an emerging clear and hybrid 
system. Rather it is a negotiated arrangement between a top-down, statist ideology and local forms 
of justice process, a balance that has historically characterized Ethiopian internal security for 
decades. The community police initiative offers a positive way of reducing friction between the 
different policing providers through acting as interlocutors but also enforcing the state’s legitimacy 
in others. Local providers can use local actors to enhance their reach and their effectiveness but also 
extend the reach of the state and the legitimacy of the law at the local level constructing a 













I fought the law and the law won 
 
‘Police in previous times were brutal in their actions. We used to run when we saw them. Now the 
changes are dramatic and the reason for this comes from two sources: the policy directs all to 
behave similarly and hence developing a mentality of serving the. In general, the police are now the 
servants of the community, not superior to the community as in previous times.’1 
 
Introduction 
This article explores an example of hybrid security provision in Dire Dawa in Ethiopia involving a 
collaboration between the state and local community and the extensive development of community 
policing approaches. Within policing, and specifically within the discourse on African community 
policing, hybridity is used to describe the relationships and structures that arise when different 
policing providers co-exist and work together to police a particular community. Drawing on the 
experience of community policing in Dire Dawa, we explore whether this initiative, although 
successful, has anything to offer beyond a version of legal pluralism or adding additional resources 
to a stretched police service and, perhaps to reflect Abrahams ‘…fundamental nature of the 
problems of relations between ordinary villagers, criminals and government’ (1998:52).  
We address a fundamental tension within a hybrid approach between community policing as a 
means of control and as a means of actual policing by the community itself (Ruteere and 
Pommerolle, 2003; Cooper-Knock, 2014; Cooper-Knock and Owen, 2015). Our argument is that 
Ethiopia has been subject to a continual balance between a centralised, state system that is seeking 
hierarchical control and has historically clashed with entrenched local systems of hierarchy, 
including policing and justice. The introduction of community policing in Dire Dawa represents a new 
chapter in this continual negotiation between the central and the local and the net effect of the 
policing approach has been to grant significant roles for the local community in spreading ideas of 
formal justice as well as recognising the importance of local conflict mediation, for example. In one 
sense all parties have an interest in reforming a system that had become rotten, but tensions remain 
between those seeking more state control and those seeking local power according to tradition. 
At the heart of the argument is examination of a fundamental tension that remains unresolved in 
Ethiopia: how does a state-led, top-down, government initiative manage to cede power to local 
systems of justice and why? Within this contradiction lies a series of issues including the relationship 
between a previously oppressive police force designed to terrify, the new police force and local 
resistance from traditional authorities; and the tension between customary law and formal, state 
law. This paper argues that whilst this tension is unlikely to be resolved any time soon, it forms the 
basis for a continuing negotiation between the state and traditional authority. Furthermore, whilst 
there is a recognition that local traditional authorities can play a role in some approaches to crime, 
conflict and justice, there is also a clear use of community policing to assert the power of the 
constitution, human rights law and formal systems, and to enhance the role and power of the police 
at community level. 
1 Interview with Tadele and Motuma, aged 22 and 18, Village 5, 12/3/2017. 
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This article begins by outlining the links between community policing and hybrid security. It then 
briefly sets out the Ethiopian context and discusses the methodology that was used and the 
limitations of research in relatively unstable environments. It also highlights the lack of statistical or 
detailed survey information available – or indeed the lack of opportunity to carry out detailed 
surveys – and the continued reliance on perceptions of security rather than detailed data. The article 
then sets out the broad situation in Dire Dawa and, drawing on the extensive fieldwork findings, it 
discusses the tensions between hybrid approaches and assimilation in to the state system. Finally it 
makes the point that community policing here has been successful in building considerable trust, but 
this has resulted in every interviewee reporting reductions in crime, whilst the crime figures have 
increased. There may be several reasons for that, including under-reporting under the previous, 
oppressive regime, but this is unclear. Secondly, some specific groups have benefitted from the state 
led and sponsored reform, specifically women and girls. Certainly in Dire Dawa, whilst there remains 
an issue of gender based violence, female genital mutilation and early marriage, it is clear that the 
community police have managed to rapidly increase the numbers of females reporting these crimes. 
Previously these hidden crimes had been dealt with by local authorities maintaining traditional 
inequalities and social hierarchies.  Finally, the process of community policing has been a delicate 
balance between recognising the legitimacy of local authorities to tackle certain instances of crime 
and also educating local people on modern law of the constitution. Ultimately there is a process of 
incorporation of traditional rule in to legal formality and subordination to the rule of law rather than 
a new hybrid system. 
Community policing and hybrid security arrangements  
Community policing is a concept that has been adopted across Africa in varying forms, including in 
Ethiopia (Baker, 2013; Di Nunzio, 2014), Mozambique (Kyed, 2010), Nigeria (Hills, 2014) and Sierra 
Leone (Albrecht et al, 2014). Much of this development has been undertaken by donor-led 
programmes reinterpreting approaches from the global North. The structures and processes of 
policing across Africa vary greatly, with institutionalised police structures being patchy and empirical 
policing characterized by a multiplicity of providers drawing on a wide range of authorities 
(Bierschenk, 2017).  
As Baker (2009; 2013) points out, the interpretation of community policing in Africa has largely 
consisted of the creation, recognition and incorporation of a wide range of alternative security 
providers with a correspondingly wide variation in capability, legitimacy and links to the state. This is 
a pragmatic recognition of reality, with lack of resources available to the police preventing coverage, 
particularly in rural areas (Baker and Scheye, 2007). It also presents the African state in a permanent 
state of negotiation, or mediation (Menkhaus, 2006) with non-state providers and a hybrid political 
system (Boege et al, 2008) where the state is only one provider amongst many and where 
boundaries between state and non-state, international and local, are problematized by complex 
interactions and interpenetration of providers following different logics and drawing on varying 
sources of power (MacGinty, 2010; Richmond, 2011; Luckham and Kirk, 2012).  
The hybridity debate partly addresses this discussion around balances of power between alternative 
sources of legitimacy, recognising that the extent of hybridity is partly a political choice and partly 
the result of institutional pressures arising from institutional constraints. The international 
categories of ‘state’ and ‘non-state’ create a bias that prevents analysis of the real nature of 
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domestic politics, or the ‘politics of the everyday (Schroeder and Chappuis, 2014).  This raises a 
number of issues around legitimacy and political power at the local level and part of any analysis of a 
hybrid system has to include a view of where the power lies within such systems and who exercises 
power and how. Hybridity is really an attempt to understand the empirical reality of power beyond 
the simple binaries of analytical categories like international and local. How they interact, with 
whom and what results from that interaction in both systems is the core concern of hybrid 
approaches. 
Other literature examines the nature of these local political interactions and their role in shaping, 
resisting and constraining international projects. Pouligny (2006) and Autesserre (2010) both focus 
on viewing peacekeeping from below, whilst there is a growing literature on the role of domestic 
elites in both taking opportunities to benefit from international intervention, but also in developing 
international approaches to democratic transition. Richmond (2011) and Mac Ginty’s (2010) work in 
particular takes this discussion forward by attempting to see the political actions of local actors as 
being more than mere ‘spoilers’ in a positive process of attaining liberal peace. Hybrid forms of 
governance are constructed by the complex interaction of multi-layered actors and it is the result of 
these interactions that can be said to be ‘hybrid’. The particular outcome is unpredictable and 
variable – not all hybrid orders are the same. State and customary forms of government ‘…do not 
exist in isolation from each other, but permeate each other and, consequently, give rise to different 
and genuine political orders that are characterised by closely interwoven texture of their separate 
sources of origin (Boege et al, 2008).’ In other words, the state becomes just one of many actors 
within the state building process (Jackson, 2011). 
Hybrid order is difficult to examine empirically and may encompass actors and institutions that 
rarely measure up to western normative standards of justice, or even gain from political disorder as 
a tool of political power (Chabal and Deloz, 1999). In some places those responsible for delivering 
justice may actually be those most responsible for insecurity in the first place, or alleged agents of 
insecurity may be providing a particular form of security. This may explain why the concept of 
hybridity may actually be more useful as a tool to critique liberal approaches to peacebuilding rather 
than offering a credible alternative strategy or a practical approach (Luckham and Kirk, 2012). This is 
a feature of what Goodfellow and Lindemann (2013) refer to as substituting ‘hybrid’ for ‘complex’ 
and of using the term hybrid to describe what is actually institutional multiplicity. Hesselbein et al 
(2006) describe institutional multiplicity as a context where multiple rule systems confront individual 
actors providing distinct and different normative frameworks and incentive structures in which they 
act. An end-user seeking justice may therefore be faced with a series of institutional choices each 
with different consequences and different sources of legitimacy, power and agency rather than one 
coherent hybrid system. 
Much literature refers to arrangements that are probably best described as institutional multiplicity 
rather than hybridity as a new form of institutional system (Cross, 2016). Multiple institutions co-
exist and interpenetrate rather than merge in to completely new systems. International 
organizations also identify hybridity as one way of boosting the state by adding non-state multipliers 
to service provision. In community policing, there is logic in seeking greater governance 
effectiveness by incorporating local providers through, at the very least, improving intelligence 
gathering and managing local ethnic or family clashes before they get to the state. As Baker (2013) 
points out in citing Bourdieu, the police may be strong in terms of economic capital (state and donor 
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support), cultural capital (training and experience) and social capital (history), but private firms may 
be able to compete with the police in terms of economic and cultural capital and so there is a case 
for hybrid arrangements. Non-state actors are usually strong in terms of symbolic capital (prestige 
and local legitimacy), particularly where the police are perceived negatively or as agents of foreign 
powers. The attraction in a hybrid arrangement is that non-state actors and the police can both gain; 
non-state actors gaining economic, cultural and social capital and the police gaining symbolic capital 
(Baker, 2013). Cooper-Knock and Owen (2015) argue that communities are also implicated in the 
reproduction of police practice and that police forces can authorize or limit regulatory intervention; 
exercise a unique bureaucratic power over ‘right’ and ‘wrong’; and, can take activity ‘off the books’ 
as vigilantism. In Ethiopia the history of political wrangling between core and periphery means that 
the development of community policing is the evolution of a political struggle between the central 
state and the local community.  
In practice this is a difficult set of arrangements to develop and critics point to the idea of ‘bargain 
based governance’ (Meagher, 2012: 1078) or even an emphasis on potential coercion, vigilantism 
and settling local scores rather than service provision (Cooper-Knock, 2014; Tapscott, 2016). Local 
institutions may not have a monopoly on local legitimacy and also tend to reflect local social 
hierarchies. Access to resources and networks with which to engage in hybrid arrangements are not 
equal at the local level, which creates its own political logic. Actual hybridity may be characterised by 
a series of exchanges of capital on the boundaries between actors (Baker: 2013). Given this, such 
arrangements will tend to be dynamic and uneven and some will have more options than others. 
They will also rely on the motivations of the actors involved to frame the nature of those dynamics. 
The context of Ethiopian community policing 
Ethiopia has a population of around 102 million people, including more than 80 distinct ethnic 
groups and is governed by the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), which 
follows a broadly socialist and state-led model of development. Emperor Haile Selassie ruled until 
1974 with an elitist approach that created deep societal cleavages and inequality. He was eventually 
overthrown in 1974 by the Derg military regime of Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam that espoused 
socialist intentions but was extremely violent, and left a lasting legacy of police brutality. As Ethiopia 
became increasingly riven by ethno-nationalist conflict, the Derg regime used the police to maintain 
control, meaning violence against the local population. The background to any police reform, 
therefore, remains a history of arbitrary arrests, violence and rape. In 1991, the Derg was 
overthrown, and replaced by Meles Zenawi, who ruled until his death in 2012. Meles remains an 
important figure, not least because he managed to use his cross-ethnic power base and credibility as 
former head of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), to establish a new constitution, including 
reform of the police. In 1994 he established a transitional police regime comprising of former militia 
whilst he dismissed or retrained the Derg police force and trained a new force (Denney and Kassaye, 
2013).  
A history of violent regime change, oppressive militarized rule and strong separatist movements has 
produced a history of central-local tension within Ethiopia since the early twentieth century. The 
police have been at the centre of that. Regime security is regarded as a critical element of state 
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strategy given external threats from Somalia and Eritrea, internal threats from several separatist 
groups, and a significant threat from domestic and international terrorism2. High rates of violence, 
particularly against women, mean that personal security is also high on the agenda (Burton et al, 
2011). However, as Baker (2013) points out, the state itself is aware of the limited resources 
available to it and its own inability to extend effective state control in some areas, particularly over 
the 83% of the population in rural areas. In keeping with much African practice, security is delivered 
alongside local providers, and traditional authorities retain influence at the local level. These 
authorities, however, have their own resource constraints and may also espouse values that are 
incompatible with modern perceptions of human rights or gender issues, for example. With a poor 
policing infrastructure, users are faced with a choice of inadequate state provision and lengthy 
delays in investigation or court cases, or facing a justice system that reflects local political structures 
and social hierarchies. The plural Ethiopian legal system, for example, incorporated strong influences 
from continental civil law and common law in the 1950s and 60s alongside traditional (or customary) 
laws and norms. This has resulted in multiple layers of formal, customary and religious laws and 
processes (Green et al, 2012).  
The pluralistic legal system is partly mirrored by policing, with a strong influence of traditional forms 
of policing beyond the formal police structure. The formal structure is divided in to Federal and 
Regional Police. The Regional Police manage the nine regional states whereas the Federal police are 
responsible for the federally-administered areas of Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa. As the best trained 
and equipped force, they also provide support to Regional Police, varying from the ‘more developed’ 
regions of Amhara, Harare, Oromia, Southern nations, Nationalities and People’s Region and Tigray 
where support is a negotiated activity, through to the ‘less developed’ areas of Afar, Benishangul-
Gamuz, Gambella and Somali, where the Federal Police operate more extensively and frequently 
beyond the remit of the regional government (Green et al, 2012).  
In reality, policing in many rural areas in particular is far more complex and is characterized by a 
multiplicity of institutions. These incorporate a variety of conflict resolution mechanisms including 
sharia courts, women and youth groups, peace committees and particularly traditional authorities 
and elders who are the most used reconciliation mechanism in Ethiopia (Baker, 2013). These leaders 
are in very respected positions and preside over crimes ranging from minor individual issues through 
to clan disputes over cattle raiding and even revenge killing, and the police frequently refer cases to 
them for decisions (Green et al, 2012; Baker, 2013). The judgement of the elders is frequently taken 
as the main form of justice and any leadership exercised in terms of community policing must take 
these leaders in to consideration. This leadership class can oppose or enact significant elements of 
security and justice emanating from the central state. There are also militia present at the local level, 
usually significantly outnumbering the Regional Police. Militia are effectively a politicized 
paramilitary comprising armed volunteers, frequently from the ethno-nationalist militia that 
opposed the Derg. They usually mount community patrols and man checkpoints on major roads, but 
whilst they outnumber the police, they are also seen as a political wing of the government and are 
therefore viewed with some element of suspicion (Denney and Kassaye, 2013). 
2 The internal threats include active separatist movements for Afar, Gambela, Ogaden, Oromia and Sidama, or 
five out of the nine internal states of Ethiopia, whereas terrorist threats are frequently related to either 
Ethiopia’s Somali Region on the East and South, but also from al-Shabaab (Green at al, 2012). 
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Policing and justice for many Ethiopians is therefore a process of negotiation between a series of 
multiple agencies and agents. There is also a form of continual negotiation between the central (and 
centralizing) authority of the state and state policing, and the local agency of the customary and 
religious authorities.  
Community policing is seen as a way of bringing some of these diverse elements together and 
providing a leadership role for the police following perceptions of rising crime during the dramatic 
2005 elections (Denney and Kassaye, 2013). In 2006, community policing was included as part of a 
broader police reform programme. In many ways this form of centralized introduction was surprising 
for a policy that is held to be a bottom up solution. Communities were essentially informed that they 
would get community policing as the new model and there does not seem to be any evidence 
indicating broad demand. In Dire Dawa, these reforms were embraced by the police and community 
policing incorporated in to police training. In addition, local community members were selected (by 
the community) to go for police training and were then returned to the communities as community 
police officers. As Denney and Kassaye, (2013) point out, the process of community policing was 
partly perceived at the local level as a means of formalising structures that had existed in some for 
some time, but it should also be noted that many of these systems have grown up in the absence of 
effective policing and whilst Ethiopia has a long history of dualism it has not been a hybrid, but has 
been one of interaction, not integration (Baker, 2013). The development of community policing 
since 2006 has been a fundamental change as the Government of Ethiopia explicitly pursues a policy 
of hybridity, by which they mean the incorporation of local justice in to the regular policing activity 
(Green et al, 2012). 
A key narrative arising from the research in Dire Dawa is the underlying development of a 
relationship between the police and the community itself. This was routinely stated within 
interviews, usually using the official phrase of ‘bringing the police and the people near’. Interviewees 
repeatedly identified this change while communicating support for the reduction in crime and 
satisfaction with the current practice of policing. Nearly all interviews contained references to 
practices during the time of Haile Selassie’s time in power and the transition to the Derg regime: 
‘During previous times, we were afraid not only them, but their shadows as well. We 
attempted to escape … when we saw them patrolling ... We saw the police as if they are 
always there to attack people.’ 
Many of the police commanders, clan elders, and community advisors lived through previous eras of 
brutality. These experiences influenced the national desire for police reforms and in their lifetime 
they experience a transition to a current of reduced crime and increased trust with the state police. 
In some ways, community policing arrived at a time when everyone had an interest in reforming a 
rotten system. 
Baker (2013) outlines a number of reasons for the changes to a community policing approach and, in 
general, our research supports his assertion that whereas before 2006 and probably up until 2010, 
the process was really one of recognition and interaction rather than integration. After this, the 
process intensified and community policing has become about integration in to an approach that 
incorporates traditional policing. Given the top-down introduction of the reforms, it is perhaps 
unsurprising that there are several features that point to the formalization and incorporation of 
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traditional mechanisms in to the state system rather than the genuine creation of a new hybrid. the 
The overall philosophy of the state draws on a socialist and developmental ideology that seeks to 
provide services to all people. However, lack of resources meant that this could never be realized 
and so the state needed partners. Statist ideology also dictates that non-state actors should not sit 
outside the centralized system and so the process of incorporation has been largely that of 
systematizing non-state actors including popular mechanisms of justice provision (Baker, 2013; Di 
Nunzio, 2014; Denney and Kassaye, 2013). In practice police officers have more than one option 
open to them in dealing with any one crime and can refer cases to the traditional authorities instead 
of waiting for the inefficient court system to deal with the case.  
Our research also supported the view taken by Denney and Kassaye (2015) that the absence of 
resources and the ideological drive of the state for control are not the only things that influence 
community policing. Whilst it may be that this makes community policing attractive for the 
government, the police themselves and the communities ascribe a different set of reasons for the 
introduction and subsequent success of community policing. The intention behind community 
policing is to improve outcomes, reduce crime rates and improve relationships with the community. 
Firstly, the police themselves very much saw community policing as a means of reducing crime. This 
was routinely mentioned in interviews, and the police are very keen to present community policing 
as being effective in giving people responsibility to tackle crime and support the police. Police 
officers brought up community policing as being effective in gaining intelligence on criminal activity, 
but also in empowering citizens to talk to the community police officers about crimes.3  
Research approach 
The research was undertaken by local and international researchers in Ethiopia and the UK between 
February and June 2017, including fieldwork in Dire Dawa in March 2017. The research focused on 
the district (woreda) and village (kebele) levels where most disputes are mediated. Seven kebeles 
were visited, four urban and three rural, and at each location police commanders, community police 
officers, clan leaders, and members of advisory councils were interviewed. When possible, a mixture 
of male and female police officers were interviewed. Advisory councils consisted of a mixture of 
male and female. Clan leaders are male, but in rural areas women’s associations exist, and members 
of those groups were interviewed. Non-police interviews were conducted in private rooms without 
police presence. In total, 15 in-depth interviews were conducted with police commanders in both 
urban and rural locations and with 15 NGO representatives. There were 12 focus group discussions 
with clan leaders, police officers, local associations, and community advisory council members. 
These were led by both an international and local researcher from the University of Addis Ababa, 
who also acted as translator. 
In 2016 Ethiopia experienced political protests resulting in a declaration of emergency, the 
suspension of some internet communication services, and restricted movement in the country. 
While in Dire Dawa, the researchers were escorted from site to site by assistants of the area police 
commander. At the same time, civilians involved with the community policing structure were 
selected for interview by the researchers, and were interviewed and participated in the focus groups 
3 Interview with Dire Dawa Police Commissioner, Dire Dawa, 15/3/2017. 
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without a police presence. External organisations were also accessed by the research team to 
improve the cross-referencing of the responses. Clearly respondents were those who had some role 
within the policing and justice area either through membership of a committee or a local advocacy 
NGO. The security situation and the relationship with the police prevented a wider survey approach. 
This assessment is also cross-referenced with a wide range of published and unpublished studies in 
Ethiopia, all of which experience similar issues. The research team strove to make the research as 
objective as possible given the need for reliance on the police for access.   
However, as Green et al (2012) notes, it is important to recognize that systematic government or 
other statistical or survey data on community-level insecurity, crime and justice problems in Ethiopia 
is scarce. All of the issues relating to the collection of data across much of Africa are present, but are 
also exacerbated by a combination of sensitivity about crime and security and weak, patchy and 
unreliable collection and reporting of data. There are very few large scale surveys with relevant data, 
and police and court data on reported crimes is not publicly available. Police statistics are made 
available to Ministers in a summary format in annual reports and is generally difficult to interpret, 
whilst court data may be more available in urban areas but reliability is unclear (Green at al, 2009). It 
is also clear that the majority of crimes and disputes are handled outside this system where there 
are no records. Perception surveys therefore remain key sources of general crime trends in the 
absence of reliable crime statistics, even though they may not correspond to actual rates of 
criminality. Perceptions of criminality, however, do matter because even if they are not accurate 
representations of empirical reality of crime, they directly affect peoples’ behavior. In Ethiopia 
perceptions of risks of violence may affect willingness to travel to markets, schools, health care, etc.   
What does policing look like in Dire Dawa? 
 Policing structures in Dire Dawa represent something of a spectrum. There are five main policing 
departments: Criminal Investigation, Police Academy, Human Resources, Finance/Logistics, and 
Community Policing. The Criminal Investigation unit involves armed, rapid response units as well as 
units who handle more serious crimes. The Human Resources and Finance/Logistics departments 
provide administrative support for the police. The Community Policing department oversees the 
management of all the community policing officers in the region. Community police officers are 
nominated by the community to serve in that community, which also vets them. These officers are 
then centrally trained in policing and then posted back in to those communities as police officers. 
The community is additionally responsible for funding the construction of the community police 
stations in their immediate area. These stations are typically one room buildings open 24 hours a 
day with living areas attached to the station. Communities open bank accounts and citizens 
contribute money until the goal is met, then the community also participates in the construction of 
these structures. 
The Community Policing structure in Dire Dawa consists of 11 urban zones and 4 rural zones. Each 
zone is then broken down into different subdivisions: kebeles, katana, blocks, and ‘family police’. An 
important, but potentially confusing conflation of the word ‘policing’ emerges at this level. There are 
community police officers who are paid by the state who perform official roles, but equally 
important to the strategy of community policing is the assistance of the community in the process, 
and these members are also referred to as ‘police’ or community advisors. In one zone, there were 
115 advisory council members, all elected by members of that zone. This is the same for village 
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‘police’, block ‘police’, campus ‘police’, and family ‘police’. At the village and block level, the ‘police’ 
are members of the community, often elders, priests, or other individuals of influence. At campus 
level, the ‘police’ are children whose responsibilities include making sure peers do not bring cell 
phones to school and making sure students do not skip classes. The concept of ‘police’ is deeply 
entrenched within communities. 
One of the most Orwellian sounding aspects of this approach is the idea of ‘family police’. These are 
typically fathers or older sons within large family units at the local level, mirroring the social 
hierarchies of traditional structures. Family police essentially control small scale activity like petty 
theft, truancy and family disputes, but may also get involved in broader crimes related to marriage 
of underage girls or genital mutilation where the family police are expected to liaise with the 
community police. Once it goes beyond the family’s ability to resolve the issue this will then be 
reported to block police and the community police will become involved. In this way, local disputes 
can be managed by customary or family structures that are incorporated in to a bigger policing 
structure, but which don’t necessarily involve the police themselves.  
Crime in Dire Dawa is dominated by ‘assault’. Between 2012 and 2016 there were 6903 assaults, 
3011 thefts, 2883 incidences of anti-social behaviour or minor fights and 2067 minor disputes45. 
Homicide is low with only 84 murders and 61 attempted murders recorded.  Anti-social behaviour is 
acting outside of the desired cultural norms and ‘minor fighting’ was defined as a small fight 
involving punching or the ‘breaking of teeth’, but different from assault as there was no intent to 
cause great harm or potential death. All of these figures fluctuated significantly over the period, but 
there has been a relative increase. For example, theft increased from 301 in 2012 to 856 in 2016, 
which is clearly at odds with the overwhelming sense of reduced crime amongst local people. These 
are official figures, and so do not record instances that happened and were dealt with in the 
informal system.  
It may also reflect a willingness to report crime. This is certainly claimed by local activists advocating 
against gender based violence and several members of the community and police reported an 
increased rate of individuals feeling empowered to report crimes, specifically domestic violence.6 A 
women’s group interviewed stated that one of the key factors limiting women from reporting 
domestic violence is an economic dependence upon males. Prior to the community policing reforms, 
if a wife’s complaint about domestic abuse sent her husband to court, it might be months before the 
case was heard, and the accused might be held in prison the whole time, negatively impacting the 
family’s financial situation. Thus, the decision to seek justice for abuse victims was both a question 
of justice and economics. Being able to address some instances of domestic violence at home, rather 
than involve the court, is reportedly encouraging women to increase their use of community 
policing/local mediation to address this. As one member of a women’s organization stated: ‘Female 
4 We have already outlined the serious lack of reliable data in Ethiopia. This crime data was compiled and 
provided to the researchers by the Dire Dawa police commissioner. This information does not seem to be 
centralized in any meaningful way. 
5 Out of a total population of 341,834 and total reported crimes of 16,978. 
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applicants are far more willing to come to us for justice than in earlier days. They do not remain in 
the home when they may be beaten or raped by males’7 
Whilst the interpretation of crime figures is difficult, the perception of our interviewees was that 
community policing has certainly increased trust, which has in turn resulted in increased reporting. 
Additionally, interviews with police and other leaders identified interconnected changes in and 
around Dire Dawa. Both police and local leaders identified reduced caseloads in the court, reduced 
incarceration, lessening fear of police, and improved coordination with community leaders as direct 
results from the implementation of community policing. Previously courts were swamped and the 
accused forced to wait in cells for months. The extension of community policing and the 
incorporation of customary approaches has meant that petty cases can be dealt with outside the 
court system. Similar reductions in caseloads were also reported by the police as community leaders 
not only handled some small cases, but provided conflict mediation.  
Mediation is important in a context where conflicts between pastoralists and farmers frequently 
lead to land disputes resulting in violence.8 Police and clan leaders worked with people to reduce the 
long term impact of conflicts, through discouraging fighting with farm tools, for example. Clan 
leaders also created a rotating system of access to communal water to reduce tensions between 
farmers and pastoralists.9 Land is one issue that traditional leaders identified as being continually 
negotiated and where there is some resistance to police intervention. Disputes over land are 
extremely common and traditional leaders frequently play an important role in managing land for 
the community and presiding over disputes. One meeting with elders and clan leaders specifically 
centred around land disputes10 and revealed a dual responsibility: a government mandate for the 
police, but a need for community reconciliation and patience for long-term peace.  
Beyond land, the most difficult issues related to the experience of women and girls. Female genital 
mutilation (FGM), child marriage, and child abduction were three issues mentioned in multiple 
interviews.11 Despite the ongoing difficulty of under-reporting, several individuals commented that 
the rate of reporting instances of domestic violence to police or local mediators had increased.12 
Certainly, local advocacy NGOs and women interviewed all recognized that improvements had taken 
place, although, despite these gains, interviewees identified gender issues as a major continuing 
issue because it was so deep-rooted. 
Impetus for these police reforms came from the highest levels of the Ethiopian government and 
resistance has been relatively limited in Dire Dawa. Clan leaders do occasionally attempt to settle 
violent crimes without notifying the police, but those interviewed insisted such behaviour was 
7 Interview with a Deputy Inspector in the Department of Women and Children Services, Gendekore, 
13/3/2017. 
8 Interview with Police Chief, Wahibia, 13/3/2017. 
9 Interview with Clan Leader, Wahibia, 13/3/2017. 
10 Interestingly there was also discussion of FGM, which these leaders all said had been ‘un-seen before the 
police came along, but was being dealt with in a positive fashion. There was recognition that women could 
play an important part in the community. 
11 Interview with representatives from Dire Dawa Women’s Association Interview, Dire Dawa, 14/3/2017. 
12 Interview with Officers in Women and Children’s Department, Dire Dawa, 12/3/2017. 
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becoming increasingly rare and typically limited to rural areas.13 The way community policing had 
been induced appeared to have placated local chiefs in terms of losing influence. The idea that they 
were still responsible for minor offences and took part in detailed consultations with the police, 
reassures them that they were still part of the security infrastructure. Where they seemed to have 
given ground was certainly in their management of social hierarchies, particular gender relations and 
this has gone from a system where almost nothing was reported, to one where the police deal 
directly with certain traditional practices. With FGM, for example, chiefs have largely stepped back 
from involvement, recognizing that resistance is futile. Where there have been disputes over this, 
the police are also quick to invoke the constitution and this seems to have an overarching positive 
effect on the incorporation of local communities. 
What has certainly happened is a shift in perception of the police by local communities, summarized 
by one member of an Advisory Council: 
‘Police in the previous days were distant from people. Contemporary policing … cannot 
discharge all its responsibilities unless it obtains support from the public. Both parties in 
community policing attempt to build trust to collaboratively work against crime and 
antisocial behaviours.’ 
This would suggest that there has been buy-in from the local community in to the idea of improved 
information flows between the community and the police in tackling crime. The broad approach to 
policing has meant that community members can use their own accepted means of mediation and 
conflict resolution if they wish. It is also possible for community police officers to refer individuals to 
non-state conflict resolution groups. This is not really seen as a means of avoiding involvement of 
the police, but as the police being respectful towards the role of traditional institutions. It is also 
notable how the top-down nature of the relationship works here. Whilst there may be traditional 
rules for specific offences, the constitution overrules most of them: 
‘…neighbourhood communities cooperate in passing information to police when they 
observe criminals in their surroundings. However, harmful practices, such as those 
oppressing women that are now against the constitution, still exist in those communities.’14  
In other words, the Ethiopian Constitution has banned such practices so the only remaining task is to 
educate those failing to comply. As a rural chief told us, ‘…we developed the program to educate 
people to enhance their level of consciousness about the constitution of the country’. The overriding 
understanding of community policing both publicly at high levels and also within the community at 
kebele level, is the ideology of state development and of community policing as an integral part of 
that strategy. This includes the practice of further spreading state influence in to areas where it has 
previously been patchy. As one community police officer stated: 
‘Before the Police Commission opened an office at this rural village, the community was 
unaware of what ‘police’ meant. They do not recognize that the police have legitimate 
power to arrest criminal offenders. The community was resistant [to an external imposition 
13 Interview with Dire Dawa Police Commissioner, Dire Dawa, 15/3/2017. 
14 Interview with Police Chief, Police Land Station, 9/3/2017.  
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of police]. However, the community did not take long time to understand the value of the 
police and their presence in creating a safe and secure environment.’ 
The ideology of community and police being part of an over-arching development strategy is present 
in several of the interviews. These issues were raised in conjunction with ‘taking the constitution to 
the people’ and over-riding local practices. As one police chief stated: 
‘The main problem here is … [that some decisions of the elders] … are compliant with the 
constitution of the country, while some others are designed to regulate the social order of 
the area. For example, when a homicide happens, elders attempt to settle the cases through 
traditional means, whereas homicide should only be subject to the formal, state judicial 
system. These are cases where the elders do not have a mandate and need to be placed 
under the court procedures. To avoid these misunderstandings, we developed a program to 
educate people to enhance their level of consciousness about the constitution of the 
country.’ 
The police, therefore, at least partly see community policing as spreading a judicial system in to 
community areas and using the constitution as the overarching vehicle for doing so. The power of 
the constitution is such that this was frequently cited by traditional leaders as a reason why they had 
changed their behaviour. The law seems to be winning.  
Hybridity or assimilation? 
The top down approach to community policing is an attempt to overcome some of the legacies of 
brutal regimes that used the police as a tool of oppression. Whilst labelling the approach as ‘top 
down’ implies a number of characteristics, it does represent a radically different approach to the 
past, not least in using persuasion and partnership rather than force. It also involves a wide network 
of actors collaborating to make it work. The initial decision to adopt community policing came from 
the national Ethiopian government. In each district, the police commander and their subordinates 
are responsible for implementing the reforms. With regional commanders onboard, it then became 
a process of convincing clan leaders, and creating community advisory councils in urban areas to 
assist in ushering in the desired change. Communities are now required to nominate individuals to 
be officers in their area which places the vetting demands on the community before an individual 
can even begin training at the police academy.  
This networked approach also requires a shared philosophy and set of aims that we explored during 
the research. For the police, the main driver is one of using decentralization as a means of reducing 
local crime and increasing control. When asked about their aim for their community, officers 
repeatedly returned to the idea of a ’space without crime’, or, as one police inspector stated: “to see 
an area where crime is less and [make] the neighborhood community free from the fear of crime.”15 
Similarly, one community advisory board member said “our vision is to see an area not affected by 
crime and suitable to the [movement of people] without fear of crime.”16 A separate community 
advisory board member articulated a very comprehensive answer:  
15 Interview with Police Officer, Village Six, 13/3/2017. 
16 Interview with Community Advisory Council Member, Amese, 11/3/2017. 
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‘We need to see our country at peace. Our vision is to create a community sensible to peace 
and enjoying security of living environment. We need to ensure peace and reducing the 
congestions of the justice system is one of our major aims. This will be sustained by creating 
a number of platforms where people can freely discuss issues related to creating crime free 
areas and also social and economic development.’17 
A youth committee interviewed echoed these notions. Taken together, a particular picture of 
policing in Ethiopia begins to emerge. The top down reforms were adopted quickly, and though the 
intention of decentralizing the structure of police to better reflect local needs, both local police and 
community advisory members mentioned that their actions were because it was written “in the 
constitution”.18 Clan leaders and community members regarded changes to gender-based issues as 
issues of the past because the constitution resolved them. The view of police reform, emerging from 
both police and members of the community was that policing focusses not only on crime, but on 
constructing the good relationships necessary for a peaceful community. 
This was not always straightforward and met increased resistance in rural areas where clan leaders 
were more resistant to changes in their own power. Even here clan leaders work with the police if a 
crime occurs. If people are ‘…aggressive, their case will be directed to the police after leaders of the 
clan have exhausted all means of traditional problem solving approaches.”19 One clan leader said: 
‘I can say that the work of the clan leaders is almost the work of the government. 
Community policing in this village is organized by Clan leaders, the police and the 
community. The police teach people not to commit crime and inform the police when they 
observe suspects.’20 
A significant issue facing the police reforms is the general view of women in society. This is a 
challenge because the Ethiopian constitution aims to have women filling 50% of government jobs, 
including the police, and generally improving their everyday lives.21 One proverb dominated the all 
discussions around gender during the research: “women are for the kitchen.” A local women’s 
association interviewed was both realistic about the struggle, but encouraged by the progress. They 
said: 
‘…problems arising from culture still exist. For example, FGM was dates from Ferron22 times 
and is religiously accepted. We struggled with feminist thinking and have tried to 
mainstream ideas of social and gender equality across the community.’23 
This women’s association found encouragement through a general reduction in early marriage, 
married women continuing their education, and increasing women’s literacy. Any progress made has 
17 Interview with an Orthodox Priest and Community Advisory Council Member, Village Six, 13/3/2017 
18 Interview with Dire Dawa Police Commissioner, Dire Dawa, 15/3/2017. 
19 Interview with Chief of Police, Wahibia, 11/3/2017. 
20 Interview with Clan Leader, Wahibia, 11/3/2017. 
21 VAW Report 2013: 6, Interview with Youth Association leaders, Dire Dawa, 13/3/2017. 
22 This word caused significant debate since none of us knew its meaning. In the end we discovered that it is a 
reference to ‘Pharaonic’ meaning that this was an ancient practice.  
23 Interview with Police Commissioner, Dire Dawa, 15/3/2017. 
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been achieved through dialogue with others, often in the context of traditional coffee ceremonies. 
This is a space where community police officers are particularly useful because they are embedded 
in the community and see gender equality and awareness as an important part of their job.24 
Gender-related crimes in particular were described as being ‘un-seen’ in previous regimes but 
reported now, which may indicate an increased confidence in the system and the police more 
generally, although this may be difficult to interpret. Certainly, women’s groups recognized that 
gender-related crime remained a problem, but were also reduced and increasingly regarded as 
unacceptable.  
It is interesting to note that the networked and broad leadership outlined above contains both 
enablers and obstacles to reform. The network at a local level is described by a sergeant in Village Six 
as follows:  
‘Traditional leadership has its own advantages and disadvantages. Ethnic conflict is common 
in Dire Dawa and the police are in charge of stopping the conflict. The main method the 
police have been using is through traditional conflict resolution by elders, working with the 
police in mediation. Participation of social institutions such as churches, mosques and other 
associations formed to extend help to each other during funerals and marriages may also be 
involved in the mediation process. Conflicts between the dominant ethnic groups – the 
Oromo and Somali - have been solved using all these approaches.’25 
Such an approach requires four main pillars. Firstly, both sets of leaders within the police and 
community have to recognize that they have important roles to play in this. Such disputes cannot be 
resolved by either leadership set alone. This leads on to collaborative leadership based on trust. 
Secondly, this mutual partnership relies heavily on trust, both between the parties but also between 
the leaders and the community. Thirdly, the alliance between the police and community leaders is 
one of establishing legitimacy in resolving the dispute as well as a recognition that these conflicts 
relay on underlying issues that cannot be resolved by solving a case in a formal police enquiry or a 
court. Finally, what it also illustrates is some form of shared vision of why policing is important. 
What our fieldwork shows clearly is that shared vision comes partly from the legitimacy of the state 
as embodied in the constitution, and strongly identifying reduced crime with ‘development’, but also 
from the shared belief that reducing crime is a public good. 
This raises interesting issues around the process itself and whether this is actually community 
policing, or an attempt by the state to use community systems as a multiplier to reduce crime. 
Certainly it is clear that community policing in Ethiopia more generally cannot be divorced from the 
political-economic context within which it takes place (Denney and Kassaye, 2013). There is clearly 
an element of that in the approach of the Ethiopian state, although that would be reducing the 
initiative in too reductionist a way. What does not seem to be emerging is a separate and completely 
new hybrid system, rather the development of a partnership approach whereby the role of the 
police is enhanced at community level through increased collaboration and intelligence and also the 
use of customary methods to deal with low level crime. The end result supports Baker’s (2013) 
24 Interview with Police Commissioner, Dire Dawa, 15/3/2017. 
25 Interview with Police Sergeant, Village Six, Dire Dawa, 16/3/2017 
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proposal that the community policing model is really about incorporation in to the state itself rather 
than the creation of a new system. The pattern of police engagement is also enlightening in this 
respect and implies that people don’t follow the constitution because they know no better and 
therefore need to be educated. It also implies that if local authorities do not obey the law, then they 
will be educated: the law wins.  
Conclusion 
This paper has argued that community policing in Dire Dawa is certainly a success in terms of 
perceptions of criminality. Its origins in a top down approach have produced side effects that mean 
the system is not really a fully separate and new hybrid, but more of an extension of police power 
through operating alongside existing customary systems managed by traditional authorities. At the 
same time, the system has also managed to expand police power and influence through cooperation 
rather than through force, which in the context of Ethiopia is something of a novelty in itself. We 
partly agree with Baker (2013) who argues that the Ethiopian case is not simply a community 
policing model, but a more comprehensive system where there is not only an attempt to manage 
non-state systems, but a recognition and transfer of jurisdiction to them. In Dire Dawa, the police 
refer cases through the local court systems and police practice has altered as a result. Much of this is 
done through cooperation. However, it is arguable that the Dire Dawa model is not necessarily a 
hybrid system but has some similarities with other donor-led police reforms where community 
policing is about gathering intelligence to support the police, or the development of complex 
systems designed to extend central control as seen in Kenya (Ruteere and Pommerole, 2003) and in 
Rwanda (Purdekova, 2011). The Ethiopian approach can be said to be distinct in terms of accepting 
some principles of local justice, the approach to partnership, and that the community police are 
from and live within the communities themselves – it is an embedded approach (Baker, 2013). 
The research also implies that the system relies on a complex web of leadership and agents who are 
constantly negotiating, developing and resisting. This requires mediation between the formal state 
policing backed by the developmental ideology of the government, and the local communities that 
have been locked in a localised struggle for authority over decades. Community policing in this sense 
is a means of reducing friction between these two distinct spheres of juridical activity, using the 
community police themselves as a bridge between the two spheres. Moreover, the use of the 
constitution as an over-arching framework is used by the police to assert the authority of the state 
over local justice systems where those systems are said to have encroached on to the legal ground 
occupied by formal institutions. This is primarily about serious cases of murder, rape or equivalent 
where the state will assert authority over local institutions even when those institutions feel that 
they should deal with those cases. Our research implies that there has been some conflict with 
regard to some of these cases with some local officials feeling that they should be responsible for all 
justice, but where the state has then stepped in.  
One of the biggest areas of change has been in gender based crime, where the evidence shows a 
clear increase in reporting of crime to formal authorities. Respondents indicate that sexual and 
gender based crime was previously hidden, which would support the findings of earlier surveys that 
suspected under-reporting within a generally conservative attitude to women where beating was 
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commonly accepted (Burton et al, 2011).26 The same survey also reported that more than half of the 
women surveyed felt that there was no-one they could talk to about domestic violence. The 
development of a highly publicised gender related legal framework, and training within the police 
appears to have emboldened women in terms of going to the authorities to report violence against 
them. Evidence from local women’s groups as well as individual interviewees suggests that the 
community police are able to mediate and approach this issue far more than before and, at the 
same time, given that the local authorities rarely intervened in a case of domestic violence – 
reflecting the attitude that the male knows best within the household – this seems to be an area 
where local authority is happy to accept the community police as legitimate under the umbrella of 
the constitution. 
The centrally led community policing programme is at least partly an exercise in recognising the 
benefits of working together rather than attempting a wholesale replacement of a local legal system 
perceived as legitimate by local people. The interviews show that even though reported crimes have 
increased, the increase itself is a result of fewer crimes and increased reporting partly due to 
improved relations between the formal and informal agents. However, whilst there is a recognition 
of the benefit on behalf of the police, there is also a hierarchy involved here. A very common theme 
within police interviews at the local level is ‘they do not understand therefore we had to educate 
them’, reflecting a modernising philosophy deriving from the overarching developmental approach 
of the Ethiopian state. The extensive use of the constitution as a framework has not only been 
successful but also indicates a process whereby local legal systems may in fact be incorporated in to 
formal, state approaches rather than forming a new, hybrid system of policing: there is a clear sense 
of direction towards state law here. Ethiopian community policing at least partly reflects the desire 
for the state to spread, but also recognition of the limitations of the state. This system of working 
together has had clear benefits for the population in terms of crime, or at least the perception of 





26 This report also contains significant baseline data from the Ethiopia Gender Survey that compared under-
reporting of gender violence, and to a lesser extent early marriage, with a comprehensive attitudinal survey. 
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